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Abstract 
 
The codecision procedure was designed to change the distribution of power among the EU 
institutions. In theory, the codecision procedure, at least the amended version introduced by 
the Amsterdam Treaty that came into effect in 1999, weakened the Commission and placed 
the Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. We assess how the codecision procedure 
works in practice using data on the preferences of legislative actors on a large number of 
proposals negotiated between 1999 and 2009. We also test theoretical propositions derived 
from Schelling regarding the effects of policy agreement within each chamber on the relative 
bargaining success of the Council and EP. Our findings suggest that, in comparison to the 
consultation procedure, codecision has strengthened the EP and weakened the Commission. 
However, the Council holds certain bargaining advantages over the EP, and as a result the EP 
has not achieved parity with the Council under codecision.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The codecision procedure was introduced under the Maastricht Treaty (1992) to enhance the 
powers of the European Parliament. Empowering the EP was a priority because the 
introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council meant that national parliaments had 
less control over EU-level decisions, thereby creating a legitimacy problem (Rittberger 
2005). Strengthening the EP would ensure that, in theory at least, citizens maintained a direct 
channel through which they could influence and control EU decisions. Political analysts have 
scrutinised the EU’s legislative procedures in great detail (e.g. Crombez 1996; Tsebelis and 
Garrett 2000; Steunenberg 2002). The consensus is that while the initial Maastricht Treaty 
version of the codecision procedure may have been biased in favour of the Council, the 
revised version introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 placed the EP on an equal 
footing with the Council. It gave both the EP and Council powers to amend proposals and 
required that both sides approve the proposed law before it is adopted.  
While acknowledging the importance of these procedural changes, political scientists 
recognise that power depends not only on formal procedures, but also on the situational 
constraints in which political actors operate. In line with this idea, we assess how the 
codecision procedure has altered the distribution of power among the EU institutions in 
practice. We address two questions: the first descriptive, the second explanatory. First, what 
is the distribution of power among the Commission, EP and Council in practice under 
codecision, and how does this compare to the consultation procedure? Part of the answer to 
this question is that although the codecision procedure offers the EP parity with the Council, 
in practice it is in a weaker position. Our second, explanatory, question is designed to account 
for this finding: what factors explain variation in the relative bargaining success of the 
Council and EP?  
 
2. POWER AND BARGAINING SUCCESS 
 
A classic definition of power that gives an appropriate point of departure for this analysis is 
that it is the potential a person or group has ‘to realize their own will in a social action even 
against the resistance of others’ (Weber 1914/2007: 247). This definition implies that power 
is about affecting ‘social’ or ‘collective’ actions, in this context the content of legislative acts. 
Weber’s definition also recognises the distinction between power and luck, a distinction that 
was later famously emphasised by Barry (1980: 184). The phrase ‘even against the resistance 
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of others’ implies that analyses of power must also take into account the will of other relevant 
actors. In this study, we consider the policy positions of all main institutional actors in the 
EU’s legislative process on a range of controversial issues. This classical definition of power 
is appropriate given our focus on the distribution of power during the decision-making stage 
of the legislative process, between the introduction of the legislative proposal and the 
adoption (or rejection) of the proposal. If we were to focus on the formative, agenda-setting 
stage prior to the introduction of proposals or the compliance stage after laws are adopted, 
other definitions of power may be more appropriate. Furthermore, we focus on overt 
controversy, which is ‘relevant in the sense that, if it is actualized, it provides the test by 
which one can measure relative power, where parties conflict over an issue’ (Lukes 1986: 2). 
Although the actual distribution of power may differ from that laid down in treaties 
and constitutions, the formal procedural rules of decision-making affect actors’ power to 
some extent and provide the starting point for our analysis. In the EU, the two most relevant 
procedures are labelled consultation and codecision (the ordinary legislative procedure since 
the Lisbon Treaty came into force). Under the consultation procedure the Commission and 
Council are the key players, while the EP can only offer a non-binding opinion. The 
Commission makes a proposal to the Council, which can amend by unanimity or accept by 
qualified majority or unanimity, depending on the policy area. If the required majority exists 
in the Council in favour of changing the status quo, then the Commission may be in a 
position to influence which alternative to the status quo is chosen (Tsebelis and Garrett 
2000). The formalities of the consultation procedure imply that the Council and Commission 
are most powerful. Scholars disagree on whether the EP has any power at all in the 
consultation procedure: some choose to ignore the EP when modelling the consultation 
procedure (e.g. Crombez 1996), while others argue that the EP has some power due to its 
ability to delay decision-making (Kardasheva 2009).  
The codecision procedure differs fundamentally from consultation with respect to the 
balance of power it prescribes among the three institutions. The Commission is generally 
believed to be in a weaker position because its proposal can be amended by either the EP or 
the Council, and ultimately the EP and the Council may decide on an outcome without the 
agreement of the Commission. There is some debate as to whether the Commission has any 
power at all; some authors assume it has none (e.g. Crombez 1996, Tsebelis and Garrett 
2000), while others argue the Commission can influence outcomes in its informal role as 
mediator between the EP and the Council (Rasmussen 2003; 2011).  The EP is in a much 
stronger position under codecision than consultation, as its support is required to adopt any 
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legislation. Under the Amsterdam Treaty version of the procedure, with which we are 
concerned here, the EP and Council are formally equal since they both must agree on the 
content of the proposal and neither has a formally defined first-mover advantage in the 
procedure (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). Protracted disagreements between the EP and Council 
are resolved in conciliation committees composed of representatives of each chamber. In 
practice, many proposals are decided on at an earlier stage, often after informal negotiations 
between the two institutions. 
Although the EP and Council are formally equal according to the codecision 
procedure, this does not necessarily imply that they have equal power in the Weberian sense 
of being able to realise their policy preferences in the contents of legislative acts. The 
congruence between actors’ stated policy preferences and decision outcomes is often referred 
to as their ‘bargaining success’. Differences between the EP and Council’s bargaining 
success may result from imbalances in the distribution of power that emerge during 
bargaining. Bargaining between two players is shaped by each player’s expectation of what 
their opponent will accept (Schelling 1960: 21). Negotiators are likely to claim that their 
position is final (i.e. threaten to reject any offer that is not in line with their stated position), 
but this threat is not credible if the negotiator stands to lose more than she would gain by 
rejecting an offer. For this reason, the location of the status quo (which following the 
conventional use of this term in the literature is the outcome that would occur in the event of 
no agreement) is generally assumed to be an important factor in shaping bargaining success. 
If both players are on the same side of the status quo (e.g. both want to increase spending on 
a particular project, but by different amounts), the player further from the status quo is in a 
weak bargaining position because she has more to lose if the negotiations break down. 
According to this logic we expect the side that is closest to the status quo to get exactly the 
outcome they want (Napel and Widgrén 2006: 135). If the two players are on opposing sides 
of the status quo, then we expect there to be no agreement. Again, this means that the player 
who is closer to the status quo does better. We therefore test the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Under codecision, the legislative institution (EP or Council) that is closest to the status 
quo has more bargaining success.  
 
Napel and Widgrén (2006) argue that the Council is more often closer to the status 
quo than is the EP due to the voting rules in each institution. The Council decides by 
qualified majority voting, while the EP decides by simply majority in its first reading.  
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Consequently, the pivotal actor in the Council (the member state whose support is required if 
the Council is to agree to a change from the status quo) is likely to be more conservative than 
the pivotal actor in the EP, the median MEP. In addition, research shows that the positions 
taken by the EP are often further from the status quo than are member states’ positions 
(Thomson 2011: 64). Thus, if Hypothesis 1 is true, this is likely to benefit the Council on 
average.  
A second potential source of bargaining strength can be derived from Schelling’s 
conjecture that negotiators benefit from perceived constraints imposed on them from outside 
(Schelling 1960: 22, Putnam 1988). In the context of codecision, external constraints on 
negotiators from the EP and Council come from their parent chambers that must ratify any 
deal. Our main theoretical argument is that there is a positive relationship between the level 
of agreement within a chamber and its bargaining success. If a chamber is united in favour of 
one position, its negotiators can credibly claim that they cannot accept another offer. By 
contrast, if there is division within a chamber, there is likely to be a greater range of 
alternatives that would be acceptable
1
. Kreppel’s (2002) research on the conditions under 
which the EP’s amendments are approved also concludes that approval rates are higher when 
the EP is more united. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Under codecision, internal division in a legislative institution (EP or Council) reduces 
its bargaining success. 
 
We expect internal division in the EP to have a greater effect than internal division in 
the Council for two reasons. The first reason concerns the different levels of transparency in 
the EP and Council. Decision-making in the EP is transparent: representatives from the 
Council and Commission are present at committee meetings; plenary debates are held in 
public; and committee and plenary votes are recorded (Corbett et al. 2011: 153). Thus, if the 
EP is internally divided, the Council will know this and can be expected to exploit it in 
negotiations. In contrast, Council meetings (at the various levels) typically take place in 
private. This lack of transparency may limit the ability of the EP to exploit division in the 
Council. The second reason why division in the EP may matter more than division in the 
Council concerns the voting rules under codecision. In order for the EP to amend the 
Council’s common position at the second reading, an absolute majority is required. This 
threshold can be quite restrictive given the high level of absenteeism in the EP. If none of the 
amendments tabled in the EP second reading receives the support of an absolute majority of 
6 
 
MEPs, then the Council common position is deemed approved (Rules of Procedure of the 
European Parliament, 2009: Rule 72). This places negotiators on behalf of a divided EP at a 
disadvantage, as there is a possibility that the EP will not be able to sustain its position 
through the second reading.   
We argued that a unified chamber places an external constraint on negotiators that 
strengthens their bargaining position. However, it is possible that under certain circumstances 
a divided chamber can also provide such a constraint. We encountered this argument on a 
number of occasions in interviews with key informants with respect to division in the 
Council, although never with respect to division in the EP. For example, the financial 
services directive (COD/2005/245) raised considerable controversy in the Council and was 
resolved as an early agreement. Our key informants reported that when meeting 
representatives of the EP, the Council negotiators highlighted the difficulty of reaching 
agreement in the Council. The Council negotiators emphasised that if the EP were to break up 
this agreement in the Council by imposing its own opinions, this could easily destroy the 
progress that had been achieved. In general, however, we expect that division in the parent 
chamber increases the likelihood that a negotiator will concede ground to the opposing side.  
 
3. DATA 
 
Our analyses are based on information from the DEUII dataset, a detailed description of 
which is given in Thomson et al. (2006) and Thomson et al. (2012). The information consists 
of key informants’ estimates of the stated policy preferences of the Commission, each 
member state and the EP on 274 specific controversial issues that were raised by 112 
legislative proposals. We only include issues on which the decision outcome is known and 
the EP took a position. The legislative proposals selected include a broad range of policy 
areas in legislative decision-making before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (mainly 
the years 1999-2000 and 2004-2009).  
Each of the 274 controversial issues in our analysis is reconstructed as a 0-100 policy 
scale, as illustrated in Figure 1, which refers to an issue from the proposal on waste 
(COD/2005/281). This proposal was introduced by the Commission because existing 
regulations on standards for waste management and waste reduction had given rise to some 
uncertainties. Four main points of controversy arose in relation to this proposal, one of which 
related to the classification of waste incinerators as either ‘recovery operations’ or ‘disposal 
operations’. This distinction is important because waste recovery operations are permitted to 
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handle imported waste and also go towards meeting recovery targets set by other EU 
legislation. At one extreme in this controversy, represented as position 0 on the scale, is the 
‘green’ position that incineration should not be classed as recovery under any circumstances. 
At the opposite end of the scale is the ‘brown’ position that most incinerators could be 
classed as recovery operations.  Three other alternatives were put forward, and key 
informants placed these at positions 20, 40 and 60 to reflect the political distances between 
them. The main political difference was between the EP that favoured the continuation of the 
status quo, which meant that no incineration is classed as waste (position 0), and member 
states and the Commission that wished to classify incineration as recovery at least if certain 
conditions were met. The outcome is clearly more in line with the positions of the member 
states and Commission than with the position of the EP. Key informants also estimated the 
levels of importance that each actor attached to each of the controversial issues. They also 
estimated each actor’s issue salience on a scale of 0 to 100.  
 
<Figure 1> 
 
The evidence from the waste controversy provides mixed support for the hypotheses. 
Although the EP supported the status quo while the member states wanted change, contrary 
to the first hypothesis the outcome was not closer to the EP’s position than member states’ 
positions in the Council. The evidence is somewhat more in line with the second hypothesis, 
since the EP was more divided than average. There was a vote in the responsible EP 
committee (the result was 37 votes to 6), while half of the reports we examine were adopted 
unanimously. Furthermore, the specific amendment in the EP first reading establishing the 
position that incineration cannot be classified as a recovery operation (Amendment 83) was 
passed by a relatively narrow margin, with 384 in favour, 299 against and two abstentions. 
This internal division may have been a factor in the EP’s low level of bargaining success. The 
Council was also divided, as shown by the different positions taken by the member states, 
although somewhat less divided than average in the cases we examine.  
 
 
4. THE POWER DISTRIBUTION UNDER CONSULTATION AND CODECISION 
 
The analyses in this section model decision outcomes on each controversial issue as a 
weighted average of the policy positions of the Commission, EP and Council members. The 
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weights used are the products of the levels of importance each actor attaches to the issue in 
question and the power each actor can bring to bear on the decision outcome. This weighted-
average formula, sometimes referred to as the compromise model, has been discussed 
extensively elsewhere (see Achen 2006a). Despite its computational simplicity, this formula 
has been linked to important theories, notably the Nash Bargaining Solution. In a head-to-
head contest with apparently more sophisticated models, this formula outperformed all others 
in a test of its predictive accuracy (Thomson et al. 2006). For the present analyses, this 
formula neatly encapsulates our Weberian view of power, in which decision outcomes are 
defined by the extent to which actors choose to exercise their power in the face of resistance 
from other actors. 
The following analyses apply a large number of alternative assumptions regarding the 
distribution of power among the three institutions in alternative specifications of the 
compromise model. We then compare the predictions of decision outcomes made by these 
different specifications with the actual decision outcomes. We infer that the assumed 
distribution of power that makes the most accurate predictions best reflects the actual 
distribution of power. Given our focus on the inter-institutional distribution of power, we 
simplify the calculations by assuming the distribution of power within the Council reflects 
voting power as measured by the Banzhaf voting power index (Banzhaf 1965)
2
. The power 
weight for the Council as a whole on a given issue is calculated as the combined weights of 
the member states taking a position on that issue. We then assign weights to the EP and the 
Commission as a proportion of the Council weight. For instance, if the EP is assigned a 
power weight of 10 and the Commission a weight of 20, this means that the EP and 
Commission are given respectively 10% and 20% of the combined power weights of the 
member states taking a position on a given issue.  
Thomson and Hosli (2006) and Thomson (2011: chapter 8) previously applied this 
modelling approach. The present analysis differs in the way in which we calculate the 
predictive accuracy of the predictions made by the different model specifications. We 
measure model fit at the proposal level rather than the issue level as these previous studies 
did, to take account of the fact that some proposals have more issues than others. The 
following analysis calculates the Euclidean distance (in the multi-issue space) from the 
prediction to the outcome, and divides this by the number of issues within the proposal. This 
is similar to the approach used by Achen (2006b: 282) to test the predictive accuracy of a 
diverse range of models. Our main findings with respect to the distribution of power are 
similar to those of Thomson and Hosli (2006) and Thomson (2011: chapter 8). 
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The following analyses deal separately with the proposals subject to consultation and 
codecision. We calculated the mean model error across the 52 consultation proposals for 
different distributions of power among the institutions. The lowest mean model error occurs 
when the Commission is assigned a power weight of 31% of the Council and the EP a power 
weight of 16% of the Council. This is illustrated in the left of Figure 2, which plots the 
average model error for different combinations of EP and Commission power. Three different 
values of EP power are shown in the three lines (0, 16% of Council and 50% of Council). The 
model error is lowest when the EP is assigned a weight of 16% of the Council’s total power. 
Furthermore, regardless of the power assigned to the EP, increasing the power of the 
Commission leads to significant reductions in model error until a minimum model error is 
reached when the Commission is assigned a power weight of around 31% of the Council. 
Further increases in the Commission’s power lead to increases in model error. In a 
subsequent test, we re-ran the analysis excluding issues on which the EP and Commission 
took the same position. For these cases, the best-fitting model is one that attributes 
considerably more power to the Commission than the EP (21% and 6% of the Council power, 
respectively). This suggests that while the Commission has certainly a noticeable impact on 
decision outcomes under consultation, the influence of the EP may in fact be very modest. 
 
<Figure 2> 
 
 For the 60 codecision proposals, the model that gives the Commission zero power and 
the EP a power weight of 20% of the Council produces the lowest mean error (Figure 2). 
Again, three different lines are plotted in the right of Figure 2; this time each line is 
associated with a particular value for Commission power and shows the mean model error for 
various values of EP power. The bottom line indicates that when the Commission and EP 
power are both at zero, the mean model error is relatively high. Increasing the power of the 
EP decreases the model error at first, until the EP power reaches 20% of the Council. Further 
increases in EP power result in increases in model error. Any increase in Commission power 
increases model error. Excluding issues on which the EP and Commission agreed does not 
noticeably alter the results.  
 
5. EXPLAINING VARIATION IN THE EP AND COUNCIL’S BARGAINING 
SUCCESS UNDER CODECISION 
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The previous section showed the Council to be considerably more powerful than the EP 
under codecision. This may be due to bargaining advantages that the Council holds in 
negotiations with the EP. To determine if this is the case, we now examine variation in the 
relative bargaining success of the two institutions, and test the hypotheses developed 
previously. We first develop a measure of relative bargaining success and measures related to 
the explanatory variables referred to in the hypotheses. 
 
5.1 Measurement of key variables 
 
The relative bargaining success of the EP and Council on any given issue can be measured by 
comparing the position of each institution with the decision outcome. The dataset we use 
does not include a collective position for the Council. It is therefore necessary to estimate the 
position of the Council based on the positions of the member states. We do this by calculating 
the weighted average of member states’ positions on each issue, where the weights are voting 
power (according to the Banzhaf index) and salience. The EP’s position is the position with 
which it entered negotiations with the Council. Oftentimes this is its first-reading position, 
but in the case of early agreements it is the position of the EP’s negotiators at the outset of 
negotiations with the Council. Bargaining success is measured in terms of the relative 
distance of the EP and Council from the outcome – that is, the distance between the Council 
position and the outcome, minus the distance between the EP position and the outcome. 
Hence, if the Council is further from the outcome than the EP, the variable ‘Relative distance 
to outcome’ will take on a positive value (indicating EP success). If the Council is closer to 
the outcome than the EP, the variable will have a negative value (indicating Council success). 
In the issue depicted in Figure 1, the weighted average of member states’ positions is 60.59, 
the EP’s position is 0 and the outcome is 60. The Council position is only 0.59 points from 
the outcome, while the EP position is 60 points from the outcome. The variable ‘Relative 
distance to outcome’ therefore has a value of -59.41 (i.e. 0.59-60) for this issue. Across the 
165 issues included in our analysis, this  variable ranges from -100 (i.e. the Council is 100 
points closer to the outcome than the EP) to +100 (i.e. the EP is 100 points closer to the 
outcome than the Council). The mean is -12.16, indicating that the Council is on average 12 
points closer to the outcome than the EP. 
The first hypothesis refers to the relative proximity of the EP and Council to the status 
quo.  We measure this using the dummy variables ‘EP closer to status quo’ and ‘Council 
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closer to the status quo’. For some issues, no status quo position exists; these cases form the 
reference category. 
 The second hypothesis concerns the internal cohesion of the EP and Council. We 
measure EP cohesion by examining the voting records in the committee responsible for 
drafting the report that forms the basis for the EP’s first reading opinion. EP committees tend 
to be broadly representative of the parliament as a whole in terms of party group affiliation 
(Corbett et al 2011: 146) and the final committee vote on a report is always recorded. The 
votes are very often unanimous: of the codecision proposals examined here, the responsible 
EP committee adopted its first reading report unanimously 50% of the time. The occurrence 
of a committee vote indicates that a proposal is divisive, or at least potentially divisive, in the 
EP. We employ a simple dichotomous measure, ‘EP committee division’, which indicates for 
each proposal whether the responsible EP committee was unanimous (0) or divided (1). In a 
robustness test, we developed an applied another measure of EP division, which classified the 
EP as divided on an issue if there was a plenary vote on a relevant amendment that was 
supported by less than 75% of participating MEPs
3
. The results are substantively similar with 
this alternative measure. 
Turning to division in the Council, we calculate the variable ‘Council division’ as the 
weighted average distance between each pair of member states, where the weights are power 
and salience (as used previously). According to this measure, the Council is most divided 
when powerful member states that attach high levels of salience to an issue are far apart
4
. 
Returning again to the example illustrated in Figure 1, the weighted average distance between 
member states positions is 25.78 for this issue. This compares with a mean value of 33 across 
all codecision issues.  
We also include a number of control variables. Despite the previous finding that the 
Commission has no power under codecision, it does fulfil an arbitration role in negotiations 
between the EP and Council. It may be that the bargaining position of the EP or the Council 
is strengthened if they are supported by the Commission. The variable ‘Relative distance to 
Commission’ measures the distance between the Council and the Commission, minus the 
distance between the EP and the Commission. Controls are also included for the types of 
disagreements that the issues involve. Three categories of controversies are identified: 
disagreements over the level of harmonisation; disagreements over the level of regulation 
(e.g. stringent regulations versus free-market solutions); and disagreements over the level of 
financial subsidies. Previous research shows that actor alignments differ depending on the 
nature of the controversy; it may also affect the relative influence of different actors 
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(Thomson 2011: chapter 4). We include dichotomous variables for these three categories of 
issues. The categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive: as some issues were 
placed in more than one category, and some issues (a total of 56 out of 165) could not be 
placed in any of these categories.  
 
5.2  Analysis of relative bargaining success 
 
The following analysis attempts to test the hypotheses regarding bargaining success and to 
identify the extent to which these variables fully account for the observed differences in the 
relative power of the EP and the Council over decision outcomes. The analysis uses issues as 
the units of analysis and applies a multilevel random intercept model to take account of the 
dependencies between that issues within each proposal. The results are presented in Table 1. 
The coefficient for the variable ‘EP closer to status quo’ is not significant, implying that the 
EP does not benefit when it is closer to the status quo than the Council. In contrast, the 
coefficient for the variable ‘Council closer to the status quo’ is negative and significant. The 
value of this coefficient indicates that when the Council is closer to the status quo than the 
EP, the bargaining success of the EP decreases by roughly 15 points relative to the Council
5
. 
Thus, there is mixed support for the first hypothesis: the Council benefits from proximity to 
the status quo, but the EP does not. Rather, the EP appears to do best on issues where there is 
no status quo position. These are typically issues on which no EU legislation exists at the 
time of the discussion.  
 
<Table 1> 
 
In line with the second hypothesis, division in the EP has a negative and significant 
impact on the EP’s relative bargaining success. When there is division in the EP its 
bargaining success decreases by 14 points relative to the Council (p=.04). This effect is also 
negative using an alternative measure of EP division based on plenary votes, although the 
level of statistical significance is lower (p=.09). In contrast, the coefficient for the variable 
‘Council division’ is in the expected direction, but does not approach statistical significance.  
The control variables show that other factors also play a part in the relative success of 
the EP and Council. The relative distance to the Commission has a strong effect. The 
variables relating to policy type indicate that the relative success of the EP is higher for 
regulation issues and lower for issues relating to financial subsidies. This is in line with the 
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argument that the EP will be more successful on issues that impose costs on industrial actors 
(i.e. regulatory policies) than on issues that imposes costs on member states (i.e. distributive 
policies) (Burns 2005: 492; see also Shackleton 2000).  
It is also important to ask, do these factors fully account for the fact that the Council 
does better than the EP on average? This question can be answered by examining the 
expected value of the dependent variable at different values of the independent variables. 
Recall that the mean value of the dependent variable is -12.16, indicating that the Council is 
on average over 12 points closer to the outcome than the EP (Table 2). However, when 
neither side has a status quo advantage, the EP is not divided, and the level of division in the 
Council is at its average value, then the expected value of the dependent variable is 2.58 – 
indicating a marginal victory for the EP
6
. In other words, when the bargaining advantages 
that the Council enjoys due to division in the EP and proximity to the status quo are removed, 
there is a much more level playing field.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
One of the main findings from the above analyses is that while the Commission and EP have 
substantial power to shape legislative outcomes, the Council dominates the legislative process 
regardless of the procedure that applies. The best-fitting power scores give the Commission 
about 30 per cent of the Council’s power in the consultation procedure and the EP 20 per cent 
of the Council’s power in the codecision procedure. This gives each of the supranational 
institutions a similar level of power to two or three large member states. While this is 
substantial, it is not realistic to place either the EP or the Commission on a par with the 
Council as a whole in terms of its power. The power of the supranational institutions is lower 
than the formal procedural rules suggest. The codecision procedure, for instance, can 
reasonably be read as giving equal power to the Council and the EP (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 
2000). So there is certainly a difference between our findings and at least some commonly 
held views regarding the distribution of power among the institutions.  
Part of the difference between our conclusions and some other views on the 
distribution of power among the EU’s institutions is due to our focus on power as the ability 
to affect decision outcomes in the face of opposition from other actors. Observers who 
attribute greater prominence to the supranational institutions may be informed by an 
awareness of the importance of the Commission and EP in other respects. For instance, the 
Commission’s preparatory policy work, often including extensive consultations with interest 
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groups and member states, undoubtedly affects the contents of adopted legislation. The 
Commission, in addition to the Council presidency, is also adept at forging political 
compromises among other actors. Although these are important tasks, they are distinct from 
power as defined here. Similarly, the EP perhaps has more prominence than power relative to 
the Council. Not only is the EP highly visible in the process, parliamentarians often raise 
issues that did not occur in the oftentimes technical discussions that take place among 
member states’ representatives in Council working groups. Such EP actions undoubtedly also 
affect the contents of adopted legislation. Observers who claim we underestimate the power 
of the EP usually cite anecdotes in the form of prominent cases in which the EP secured 
important concessions (e.g. on the sharing of airline passenger information). We recognize 
the importance of these individual successes for the EP and policy outcomes, but our analyses 
focus on a broader selection of cases. The outcomes of this broader set of cases imply that 
when the Council members and EP take different positions on a controversy, the EP has less 
power than the Council. 
We also investigated whether the differences in the power of the EP and Council 
could be explained in terms of bargaining advantages. Although our evidence refers to 
proposals adopted at all stages of the codecision procedure, our findings are broadly in line 
with previous research that focused specifically on conciliation committee negotiations 
(König et al 2007). The results show that the relative bargaining success of the two 
institutions is influenced by relative proximity to the status quo and by internal division in 
EP. In line with the first hypothesis, the Council has a bargaining advantage when it is closer 
to the status quo than is the EP, as it very often is. So the Council’s conservatism or the EP’s 
radicalism partly explains the fact that the Council has more power, as defined here. In line 
with the second hypothesis, divisions within the EP weakened the EP’s power. However, 
divisions within the Council do not weaken the Council. The presence of an effect of internal 
divisions in the EP and absence of such an effect of internal divisions in the Council reflects 
Schelling’s insights regarding the importance of expectations about the room for manoeuvre 
available to each collective actor (Schelling 1960). When the EP is internally divided, this is 
public information since committee meetings and votes are public. Therefore, member states 
are aware that there is a range of possible outcomes that may find support in the parliament. 
By contrast, Council deliberations are held in private, despite the Council’s lip service to the 
principle of transparency and informal information flows between the Council and EP, or 
individual governments and MEPs. Structurally, the Council has an information advantage 
over the EP. This contributes to conditions in which the EP is in a structurally weaker 
15 
 
position than the Council despite the formal parity between the institutions in what is now the 
ordinary legislative procedure. 
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1
 Tsebelis (2002, p45-50) makes a similar point using a spatial model for a collective legislative body.  
His analysis indicates that when a chamber is internally divided, there is typically a greater range of 
alternatives to the status quo on which agreement can be found (p.50). However, this is not always the 
case: he also points out that there are situations in which greater internal cohesion increases the 
number of policy alternatives that the collective actor prefers to the status quo.  
2
 This assumption does not have significant consequences for our results. We also tested models 
where all member states were assigned equal power weights; the results for the inter-institutional 
distribution of power were very similar.  
3
 Where amendments were adopted by a show of hands, we classified the EP as not divided.  
4
 An alternative measure of Council division was tested, which simply took the standard deviation of 
member states’ positions, which gave substantively the same results. 
5
 Note that this is the effect compared to the reference category – i.e. issues on which there is no status 
quo position. 
6
 This is calculated by running a model which includes only the four key variables from Model 1 (i.e. 
‘EP closer to status quo’, ‘Council closer to status quo’, ‘EP committee division’ and ‘Council 
division’), and estimating the value of the dependent variable when the values of these independent 
variables are fixed at the specified levels. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1 Analysis of relative bargaining success of EP and Council under codecision 
 
b s.e. p 
EP closer to status quo -5.29 9.76 0.59 
 
Council closer to status quo -15.54 8.18 0.06 
 
EP committee division -14.19 6.98 0.04 
 
Council division 0.08 0.21 0.71 
 
Relative distance to Commission 0.19 0.07 0.00 
 
Regulation issue 17.12 7.15 0.02 
 
Financial subsidy issue -18.08 16.48 0.27 
 
Harmonisation issue -0.49 7.22 0.95 
 
Constant -4.53 10.31 0.66 
 
Wald chi-square 21.55  0.00 
 
Number of observations 165 
Note: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression, where the levels are issues and proposals. There are 165 issues 
nested within 60 proposals. Dependent variable is ‘Relative distance to outcome’.  
 
 
 
Note: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; 
FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: 
Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: 
Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: United Kingdom; COM: Commission; EP: European Parliament. 
 
Figure 1 A controversial issue from the proposal on waste   
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Figure 2 Model errors for various combinations of Commission and EP’s relative power 
under consultation (left) and codecision (right). 
Note: The lines depict the error of the model while varying the power of the Commission and 
EP from 0 to 50% of the Council’s power. 
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